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CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT, AND THE
POWER TO DECLARE WAR:
A REQUIEM FOR VIETNAM
WILLIAM VAN ALSTYNEt
Several arguments have been advanced in support of the Presi-
dent's authority to continue use of the Armed Forces in Vietnam with-
out a congressional declaration of war as provided by the Constitution.
Congressional ratification of the Southeast Asia Treaty and the Charter
of the United Nations, as well as enactment of the Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution, are often urged as constituting sufficient congressional
authorization for the President's actions. Some have gone further and
contended that congressional authorization was not a prerequisite in
the Vietnam conflict because the President never exceeded his his-
torically recognized authority to act unilaterally in defense of the
security of the United States. In this Article and the one that follows,
the authors respond to each of these arguments. Professor Van Alstyne
examines whether delegation of Congress' authority to declare war is
ever permissible either by treaty or by joint resolution. He concludes
that while enactment of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution may have
constituted a sufficient congressional authorization, the President has
acted illegally since that resolution's repeal. Professor Berger argues
that the President's unilateral acts in Vietnam can find no justification
in either the text of the Constitution or in past presidential practices;
Taking issue with Professor Eugene V. Rostow, Professor Berger con-
tProfessor of Law, Duke University. BA. 1955, University of Southern California;
LL.B. 1958, Stanford University.
This Article was originally prepared for the symposium series at North Carolina
State University in the spring of 1972, "Beyond Vietnam: American Foreign Policy in
the Seventies." The excellent assistance of Mr. Edward Reibman is gratefully acknowl-
edged.
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cludes that the recently considered War Powers Bill, designed to cur-
tail future unilateral acts of war by the President, is a return to
constitutional precepts which has long been necessary.
The accretion of dangerous power does not come in a day. It
does come, however slowly, from the generative force of un-
checked disregard of the restrictions that fence in even the
most disinterested assertion of authority.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Far more than a decade has elapsed since the first insertion of
active United States military advisers into Vietnam, and we have now
passed the sabbatical of 1965, when a half-million American troops
entered that war. A number of months have put behind us the an-
niversary of the date when new thrusts were directed into Laos and
Cambodia as well, an event memorialized this year by the resumption
of massive air and naval bombardment of North Vietnam. A hundred
billion dollars, fifty thousand of our own dead, three hundred thousand
personal casualties, the new chemistry of spoliation and the old al-
chemy of bombs and napalm greater than any previous war in the
history of mankind: headstones of American history in the late twen-
tieth century.
The sheer endurance of this staggering fait accompli of war over-
hangs the Constitution and seems to ridicule its present usefulness.
Renewed inquiry into the continuing legitimacy of the Vietnam War
would seem to be especially pointless, moreover, in light of the State
Department's lengthy Legal Memorandum of 1966 arguing that the
executive practice of war has become so well established as virtually
to have been absorbed into the Constitution even in the absence of
any antecedent declaration by Congress.2 If the matter were thought
doubtful and not entirely moot on that account alone, still there is
but the one forum in which scholastic opinion may evidently be com-
posed for any useful purpose, the Supreme Court, and for reasons it
has declined publicly to share at all, that forum has thus far been
entirely closed to the question.
IYoungstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 594 (1952) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring in the upholding of an injunction against the executive seizure of steel
mills during the Korean War).
2 OpFICE or TH LEGAL ADVISOR, U.S. DEP'T or STATE, TnE LEGALITY Or U.S. PAR-
TICIPATION IN THE DEENSE or VIETNAm, reprinted in 112 CONG. REC. 5504-09 (1966).
83See, e.g., Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869
(1971); Mora v. McNamara, 387 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 934 (1967);
Luftig v. McNamara, 373 F.2d 664 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 945 (1967). It is
assuredly debatable whether cases otherwise ripe, brought by parties with appropriate
standing, under clearly adversary circumstances with terrific personal interests at stake
are nonetheless not "justiciable" so far as the declaration of war clause is concerned.
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Yet, what was occasionally denied consideration as "nonjustici-
able" in the past has been more than once subsequently considered on
the merits; 4 and though the Court has yielded an almost obsequious
deference to other departments of government from time to time, even
upon consideration of the merits of a case, it has just as often eventu-
ally reclaimed the independence of its judgment.5 Whatever the im-
mediate political result, moreover, it is surely never trivial to form
one's own opinion as to the legitimacy of executive authority which'
presumes upon the horrendous use of armed force. Perhaps the duty
to do so is most pressing precisely when there is no other forum of
decision. The recent practice of several presidents since World War
II to draw extraordinary inferences from their powers as Chief Exec-
utive and Commander in Chief (in eclipse of the war declaration clause)
is certainly not dispositive of the question unless, by thinking it so,
we compound the error and invest it with the ironic power of self-
fulfilling prophecy.
In addition, the claim that constitutional legitimacy may be settled
by the sheer weight of an unexamined governmental practice (and thd
claim of practice is not in this instance nearly as long-lived or as
substantial as alleged) ought not lightly be accepted. To this extent,
no apology is owing for the suggestion that recent practice is perhaps
the least instructive source of constitutional legitimacy. Twice within
this generation the government's reliance upon such practice was spe-
cifically rebuked when the Supreme Court finally came to terms with
See Bickel, Congress, the President and the Power to Wage War, 48 CHI.-KEzNT L. REV.
131 (1971); Henkin, Viet-Nam in the Courts of the United States: "Political Questions,"
63 AM. J. L-z'. L. 284 (1969); Schwartz & McCormick, The Justiciability of Legal
Objections to the American Military Effort in Vietnam, 46 TExAS L. REv. 1033 (1968);
Tigar, Judicial Power, the "Political Question Doctrine'" and Foreign Relations, 17
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1135 (1970). Compare Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Term-Fore-
word: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARv. L. REv. 40 (1961), with Gunther, The Subtle Vices
of the "Passive Virtues'--A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review,
64 CoLum. L. R v. 1 (1964). Given what is at stake for those willing to risk prolonged
imprisonment as a condition of being heard at least on this bare thresbhold question
alone, however, when all constitutional requisites, statutory criteria, and announced
judicial standards for the rationing of certiorari have been satisfied, it is surely a singular
indecency that the Supreme Court declines even to hear the justiciability issue on the
merits: "These petitioners should be told whether their case is beyond judicial cogni-
zance." Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S. 934, 939 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting from the
denial of certiorari).
4 Compare Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965), Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S.
1 (1964), and Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), with South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276
(1950), and Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946) (reapportionment). For analogous
developments in judicial willingness to consider constitutional questions previously
avoided, see, e.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S.
83 (1968).
5 Compare United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967), with American Communi-
cations Ass'n, CIO v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950). Compare Duncan v. Kahanamoku,
327 U.S. 304 (1946), with Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). Compare
Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866), with Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.)
1 (1849).
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the issue in controversy. In 1952, military seizure of a private steel
mill by presidential directive, during the Korean War but without
congressional authorization, was rested in argument by government
counsel partly on the prior practice of other American presidents act-
ing under allegedly similar emergency circumstances. Concluding that
any such unexamined prior executive practice was virtually weightless
in measuring the constitutional propriety of still another instance of
that practice, the district court concluded:
[I]t is difficult to follow [the government's] argument that
several prior acts apparently unauthorized by law, but never
questioned in the courts, by repetition clothe a later un-
authorized act with the cloak of legality.6
Upon appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the injunction against the
Secretary of Commerce, in an opinion accompanied by the mindful
dictum with which this Article is prefaced.
More recently still, the Congress became embroiled in controversy
respecting the entitlement of one of its members to assume his seat.
Though no one had disputed that Adam Clayton Powell met the only
enumerated constitutional standards for eligibility, Powell was none-
theless excluded on the determination of the House that he was unfit
on other grounds. When the ensuing controversy eventually came be-
fore the Supreme Court, counsel for Congress correctly noted that
since 1868 the House of Representatives had excluded a number of
members on the basis of its determination of disqualifications other
than those expressly listed in article I; given the ambiguity of the
document (and the virtual "nonjusticiability" of this internal House
matter), he argued, this practice of Congress must itself be seen as
an illumination of its constitutional authority. In declaring against
the use of that claim of authority, however, the Court offered an ob-
servation which will be taken to heart in this Article as it relates to
the use of governmental practice in aid of constitutional interpreta-
tion, a limited use restricted to inferences from practices reasonably
contemporary with the Constitution itself:
That an unconstitutional action has been taken before surely
does not render that same action any less unconstitutional at
a later date .... The relevancy of prior exclusion cases is
limited largely to the insight they afford in correctly ascer-
taining the draftsmen's intent. Obviously, therefore, the prec-
edental value of these cases tends to increase in proportion to
their proximity to the Convention in 1787. And, what evi-
dence we have of Congress' early understanding confirms our
6 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 103 F. Supp. 569, 575 (D.D.C. 1952).
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conclusion that the House is without power to exclude any
member-elect who meets the Constitution's requirements for
membership.'
II. THE ESSENTIAL MEANING OF THAT POWER IN CoNGRESs
"To DECLARE WAR"
Article I of the Constitution provides for a Congress in whom
"[a] l legislative powers herein granted shall be vested .... ." Included
among the specific powers listed in article I, section 8, is that "[t]he
Congress shall have Power... To declare War .... " Also within that
section is the power to grant letters of marque and reprisal, the au-
thority to make rules concerning captures on land and water, to raise
and support armies, to provide and maintain a navy, to make rules
for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces, and
other associated matters.
In article II, which describes the executive power, invested in a
single individual, section 2 provides that the President shall be "Com-
mander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States," and
that he shall have power to make treaties by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate. Section 3 of the same article further provides
that the President shall from time to time give to the Congress infor-
mation on the state of the Union, recommend to their consideration
such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient, and that he
shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed. Finally, provision
is made by section 4 of article IV that the United States shall guar-
antee to every state in the Union a republican form of government,
that it shall protect each of them against invasion and, on application
of a state's legislature or of the state's executive (when its legislature
cannot be convened) against domestic violence as well.
Among those interpretations consistent with the language of these
several war-related provisions are at least three which offer quite
different impressions of the congressional power to declare war. First,
perhaps this particular clause merely confirms a ceremonial duty on the
part of Congress to ratify an obvious condition of war and thus to
give a certain official imprimatur of its own to events of de facto
belligerency that have already taken place. Second, and more sig-
nificantly, perhaps it establishes in Congress a more definite power
of veto, to arrest what is otherwise an executive power to make war,
to declare against a war and thereby to check the executive from
further pursuit of specific hostilities. Or third, that in the absence of
an affirmative declaration by Congress authorizing the extraterritorial
7 Powell v. McCormick, 395 U.S. 486, 546-47 (1969) (footnote omitted).
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use of armed force as a reasonably unmistakable exercise of this very
power, the President may not pursue any national policy whatever
through the use of such force. There are doubtless other possibilities
as well, and certainly each of these may permit significant differences
of nuance, but they do not seem unfair to the basic alternatives of
construction.
The most frequently used first source in coming to terms with
these and other possible interpretations and questions affected by the
war declaration clause are the notes of James Madison made during
the course of the discussions of the Constitutional Convention. As
originally drafted, the clause provided that Congress shall have power
to "make" war, but debate ensued which Madison reported as follows: s
"To make war"
Mr. PINCKNEY opposed the vesting this power in the Leg-
islature. Its proceedings were too slow. It would meet but
once a year. The House of Representatives would be too nu-
merous for such deliberations. The Senate would be the best
depository, being more acquainted with foreign affairs, and
most capable of proper resolutions. If the States are equally
represented in Senate, so as to give no advantage to large
States, the power will notwithstanding be safe, as the small
have their all at stake in such cases as well as the large States.
It would be singular for one authority to make war, and an-
other peace.
Mr. BUTLER. The objections against the Legislature lie in
great degree against the Senate. He was for vesting the power
in the President, who will have all the requisite qualities, and
will not make war but when the Nation will support it.
Mr. MADISON and Mr. GERRY moved to insert "declare,"
striking out "make" war; leaving to the Executive the power
to repel sudden attacks.
Mr. SHERMAN thought it stood very well. The Executive
should be able to repel and not to commence war. "Make"
better than "declare" the latter narrowing the power too
much.
Mr. GERRY never expected to hear in a republic a motion
to empower the Executive alone to declare war.
Mr. ELLSWORTH [said] [t]here is a material difference
between the cases of making war and making peace. It should
be more easy to get out of war than into it. War also is a
8 2 REcoRDs Or THE FEnmAL CoNvToN OF 1789, at 318-19 (M. Farrand ed. 1911)
(Friday, Aug. 17, 1787) (minor changes concerning grammar, abbreviations and appearance
have been made to facilitate reading) [hereinafter cited as REcoans].
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simple and overt declaration, peace attended with intricate
and secret negotiations.
Mr. MASON was against giving the power of war to the
Executive, because not safely to be trusted with it; or to the
Senate, because not so constructed as to be entitled to it.
He was for clogging rather than facilitating war; but for fa-
cilitating peace. He preferred "declare" to "make."




Conn. no (On the remark by Mr. King that "make" war
might be understood to "conduct" it which was an Executive
function, Mr. Ellsworth gave up his objection, and the vote








Mr. Pinckney's motion to strike out the whole clause, dis-
agreed to without call of States.
As thus accepted--"The Congress shall have power.., to declare
War"-it was apparent that the draftsmen wished to avoid their ex-
perience under British rule where an individual alone had power to
determine the alleged necessity of embarking upon a course of war
and thus to draw the people into foreign adventures that required their
blood, extracted their treasure, and subordinated their liberties. It was
also clear that the institutions and processes of the United States
should be so arranged as to make it harder to initiate war and easier
to achieve peace, and yet not hamstring the executive when conducting
a war already declared or deny him an interim emergency power as the
Commander in Chief to repel attacks against the United States until
Congress could meet to consider its will.
An examination of the Federalist Papers, those political essays
which accompanied the general ratification controversy in New York,
assists in clarifying what was meant by the Philadelphia Framers. Of
particular significance is Federalist Number 69, allegedly authored by
Alexander Hamilton, the ardent leader of the centralist-federalist party.
1972]
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In this instance, moreover, nothing is to be found in the anti-federalist
tracts9 which deny or take exception to Hamilton's view that:
The President is to be commander-in-chief of the army and
navy of the United States. In this respect his authority would
be nominally the same with that of the king of Great Britain,
but in substance much inferior to it. It would amount to
nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the
military and naval forces, as first General and admiral of the
Confederacy; while that of the British king extends to the
declaring of war and to the raising and regulating of fleets
and armies,--all which, by the Constitution under considera-
tion, would appertain to the legislature.1 °
That the war declaration clause was urged by the federalists as a highly
important and wholly independent source of citizenry protection
against the risk of executive commitments to war, quite aside from the
separate control of Congress to raise or not to raise an army and navy
and to control the purse, is wholly reflected by the character of their
debate with the anti-federalists with respect to the anti-federalist posi-
tion that Congress should be denied authority to raise a peacetime army
at all."
These early discussions were soon put to the test of contemporary
construction during tense relations between the United States and
principalities along the Barbary Coast of North Africa, at the very
turn of the nineteenth century. At that time, American merchant ships
were set upon by outlaws known as the Barbary Pirates. President
Jefferson's reactions in his immediate Message to Congress are
illuminating:
I sent a small squadron of frigates into the Mediterranean,
with assurances to that Power of our sincere desire to remain
in peace, but with orders to protect our commerce against
the threatened attack. The measure was seasonable and salu-
tary. The Bey had already declared war. His cruisers were
out. Two had arrived at Gibraltar. Our commerce in the
Mediterranean was blockaded and that of the Atlantic in
peril. The arrival of our squadron dispelled the danger. One
of the Tripolitan cruisers, having fallen in with and engaged
the small schooner Enterprise, commanded by Lieutenant
Sterret, which had gone as a tender to our larger vessels,
was captured, after a heavy slaughter of her men, without the
loss of a single one on our part .... Unauthorized by the
9 See, e.g., THE ANT iERALISTS (C. Kenyon ed. 1966) ; J. MIA3r, T a AN=aEDEmi-
Iss-CnRcs or TH CoNsTUirunON, 1781-1788, at 119-67 (1961).
10TEB FEDEiRALIST No. 69, at 446 (B. Wright ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton).
11See, e.g., sources cited note 9 supra.
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Constitution, without the sanction of Congress, to go beyond
the line of defense, the vessel, being disabled from committing
further hostilities, was liberated with its crew. The Legisla-
ture will doubtless consider whether, by authorizing measures
of offense also, they will place our force on an equal footing
with that of its adversaries. I communicate all material infor-
mation on this subject, that in the exercise of this important
function confided by the Constitution to the Legislature ex-
clusively their judgment may form itself on a knowledge and
consideration of every circumstance of weight.2
In a later message to Congress, Jefferson held the same, steady course:
Considering that Congress alone is constitutionally invested
with the power of changing our condition from peace to war,
I have thought it my duty to await their authority for using
force in any degree which could be avoided.3
With virtual unanimity, the same attitude was shared by all contem-
poraries of these formative years. 4
Specifically, then, the lodgment of the power to declare war ex-
clusively in Congress forbids the sustained use of armed force abroad
in the absence of a prior, affirmative, explicit authorization by Con-
gress, subject to the one emergency exception: an interim emergency
defense power in the President to employ armed force to resist invasion
or to repel a sudden armed attack until Congress can be properly con-
vened to deliberate on the question as to whether it will sustain or
expand the effort by specific declaration or, by doing nothing, require
the President to disengage our forces from the theater of action.
The explanation of the use of the word "declare" rather than
"make" now seems clear as well. If it is the case that the Congress has
made a suitable determination to authorize the use of armed force to
effectuate national policy in any given instance, then discretion con-
cerning affiliated logistical, tactical, and strategic decisions properly
reposes within the presidency, consistent always, however, with the
scope of the antecedent congressional declaration. The case for un-
grudging construction of the power of the President as Commander in
Chief, acting within the specific war authorization of Congress, was
well expressed by Hamilton:
12 11 ANNALS oF CONG. 11 (1801), reprinted in 1 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF T=
PRESDmENTs, 1789-1897, at 326-27 (". Richardson ed. 1898) (emphasis added).
133 T. JEFMFRSON, WRrTIGs 400 (A. Bergh ed. 1907).
14For example, John Marshall's opinion for the Court in Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 1 (1801), was that:
The whole powers of war being, by the constitution of the United States,
vested in congress, the acts of that body can alone be resorted to as our guides
in this inquiry.
Id. at 28.
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Of all the cares or concerns of government, the direction of
war most peculiarly demands those qualities which distin-
guish the exercise of power by a single hand. The direction of
war implies the direction of the common strength; and the
power of directing and employing the common strength, forms
a usual and essential part in the definition of the executive
authority.15
The Congress would be left with a flexible power of review and control
by its continuing legislative authority over appropriations, levies upon
manpower, and, of course, the prerogative to repeal prospectively its
declaration of war.
The line between the rule and the limited exception of an interim
defensive emergency use of force seems to have been respected, inci-
dentally, in President Johnson's initial reaction to the alleged firing by
PT boats of North Vietnam on American destroyers in the interna-
tional waters of the Gulf of Tonkin in August, 1964. The original reac-
tion was limited to defensive action against those particular boats and
the immediate bases from which it was believed they had come.
Though the incident was unquestionably an act of war, it was
within the interim emergency exception of repelling armed attack, and
only a single question might fairly be raised about it in isolation.
President Johnson authorized no more than the limited "hot pursuit"
of the PT boats, their destruction, and an attack on their immediate
bases. While it is debatable that even the authorization of attack on
the immediate bases was within the executive discretion, clearly pro-
longation beyond that point in time when Congress had an adequate
opportunity to consider its will and to ratify and authorize a continu-
ation of armed force, would have been wholly illegitimate. Again, the
situation and response is well attested by presidential practice contem-
porary with the Federalist Period, witnessed by Jefferson's decision
with respect to our schooner, the Enterprise, and the Bey of Tripoli's
Cruiser:
Unauthorized by the Constitution, without the sanction of
Congress, to go beyond the line of defense .... I communi-
cate all material information on this subject, that in the exer-
cise of this important function confided by the Constitution
to the Legislature exclusively their judgment may form itself
on a knowledge and consideration of every circumstance of
weight. 6
15 TnE FEDERALIST No. 74, at 473 (B. Wright ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton) (emphasis
added).
16 1 MESSAGES AxD PAPERS oF THES PRESmINS, 1789-1897, at 327 (J. Richardson ed.
1898).
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In 1798, Hamilton was cautious in the quasi-war with France:
In so delicate a case, in one which involves so important a
consequence as that of War-my opinion is that no doubtful
authority ought to be exercised by the President .... 17
The declared executive position on this matter remained highly
consistent for a long period of years, and the fact that one or another
President may otherwise have utilized his office so to force upon Con-
gress the manner in which it may have determined to use its own
authority (as was arguably done in the Mexican-American War),18
far from providing evidence of a different rule, rather confirms the felt
necessity of securing an explicit congressional declaration as a pre-
requisite of any extraterritorial military action not under the pretense
and limitation of repelling attack. Thus, responding to inquiry on the
subject while serving as Secretary of State in 1851, Daniel Webster ob-
served:
In the first place, I have to say that the war-making power in
this Government rests entirely with Congress; and that the
President can authorize belligerent operations only in the
cases expressly provided for by the Constitution and the laws.
By these no power is given to the Executive to oppose an at-
tack by one independent nation on the possessions of another.
We are bound to regard both France and Hawaii as indepen-
dent states, and equally independent, and though the general
policy of the Government might lead it to take part with either
in a controversy with the other, still, if this interference be an
act of hostile force, it is not within the constitutional power
of the President; and still less is it within the power of any
subordinated agent of government, civil or military.19
Similarly, in his Message to Congress on December 6, 1858, President
Buchanan noted:
The executive government of this country in its inter-
course with foreign nations is limited to the employment of
diplomacy alone. When this fails it can proceed no further. It
can not legitimately resort to force without the direct author-
ity of Congress, except in resisting and repelling hostile at-
tacks. It would have no authority to enter the territories of
Nicaragua even to prevent the destruction of the transit and
1T Letter from Alexander Hamilton to James McHenry, May 17, 1798, in 1 O cIE
or NAVAL REcoRDs AND LIBRARY, U.S. DEP'T or T=E NAvY, NAVAL DoCUMENTs RELATED
TO T=n QUAsi-WAR BETwEEN THE UNITED STATES Am FRANCE 75 (1935).
18A declaration of war was entered by Congress on May 13, 1846, declaiming that
hostilities had been initiated by the other side. Even so, the House subsequently excori-
ated Polk for having "unnecessarily and unconstitutionally" begun that war. CoNo.
GLOBE, 30th Cong., 1st Sess. 95 (1848).
19 7 DIoEST or INTEmwATIONAL LAW 163-64 (J. Moore ed. 1906).
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protect the lives and property of our own citizens on their
passage.20
While serving in Congress, Abraham Lincoln drew the following sharp
line conservatively rejecting the extraterritorial use of force even
under claim of the interim emergency executive power to repel invasion:
Allow the President to invade a neighboring nation whenever
he shall deem it necessary to repel an invasion, and you allow
him to do so whenever he may choose to say he deems it neces-
sary for such purpose, and you allow him to make war at plea-
sure. Study to see if you can fix any limit to his power in this
respect, after having given him so much as you propose ....
The provision of the Constitution giving the war-making
power to Congress was dictated, as I understand it, by the fol-
lowing reasons: Kings had always been involving and im-
poverishing their people in wars, pretending generally, if not
always, that the good of the people was the object. This our
convention understood to be the most oppressive of all kingly
oppressions, and they resolved to so frame the Constitution
that no one man should hold the power of bringing oppression
upon us. But your view destroys the whole matter, and places
our President where kings have always stood.21
20 5 MESSAGES AND PAPERS oF THE PasiESMEs, 1789-1897, at 516 (J. Richardson ed.
1898).
The immediate next sentences in Buchanan's Message are these, and seem less clear:
It is true that on a sudden emergency of this character the President would direct
any armed force in the vicinity to march to their relief, but in doing this he
would act upon his own responsibility.
Id. Even assuming that in saying that by thus acting "on his own responsibility" with
emergency military force solely for the immediate "relief" of American citizens caught in
a war zone, Buchanan meant that the President would be utilizing a proper constitutional
executive power (rather than acting simply from a sense of personal duty whether or
not it is constitutionally supportable), still, in context, the most that is claimed is only
the interim emergency use of such military force as would be reasonably necessary to
secure the safe and speedy removal of our citizens, unless Congress were to authorize a
more ambitious undertaking.
212 A. LrcoLmr, Wa'r]~Gs 51-52 (A. Lapsley ed. 1905). Lincoln's subsequent execu-
tive imposition of a blockade on April 27, 1861, following the firing on Fort Sumter,
pending prompt convocation of an extraordinary session of Congress which approved
his proclamation and other interim emergency measures on July 13, 1861 (sustained five-
to-four in The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862)), are not inconsistent in the
least with this view. How far they might be independently supportable under article IV
powers, was not examined by the Supreme Court. Even so, the majority of the Court
seemed to make a distinction not only relating to the suddenness of actual civil war
hostilities, the need to meet it "without waiting for Congress," and its recognition by
other nations for purposes of triggering international law duties of neutrality by the
time the proclamation of blockade took effect, but that civil war may be distinguishable
even with respect to the declaration of war clause: "By the Constitution, Congress
alone has the power to declare a national or foreign war. It cannot declare war against a
State, or any number of States, by virtue of any clause in the Constitution." Id. at 668.
See also 7 DIGEST or INTExrATONAL LAW 172 (J. Moore ed. 1906): "Civil war begins
by insurrection against the lawful authority of the Government, and is never solemnly
declared." In directing the use of force to suppress the alleged insurrection led by Aaron
Burr, moreover, Thomas Jefferson (perhaps the most scrupulous President of all in
relating the war power to Congress) did not regard the declaration of war clause to be
involved.
Far from The Prize Cases yielding great significance regarding an uncabined exec-
utive power to sustain the engagement of major military force overseas without an
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Three decades earlier, when Colombia had drawn upon the newly
promulgated Monroe Doctrine to request the use of military force from
President Monroe against France, the administration denied its au-
thority to intervene by such means. Writing to former President Madi-
son, Monroe noted: "The Executive has no right to compromit the na-
tion in any question of war . . ." Three days later, Secretary of
State Adams formally advised the Minister of Colombia: "[B]y the
constitution of the United States, the ultimate decision of this ques-
tion belongs to the Legislative Department of the Government.
22
While a number of additional questions remain now to be ex-
amined, the configuration of immediately relevant war-related consti-
tutional clauses appears clearly to yield the following propositions:
1. In the absence of a declaration of war by the Congress, the
President may not sustain the systematic engagement of military force
abroad for any purpose whatever.
2. The interim use of military force solely to repel invasion of
the United States or to relieve American citizens from an existing at-
tack is an authorized executive war power granted by the Constitution.
That power expires ex proprio vigore when the Congress has had rea-
sonable opportunity immediately to convene and to authorize the
continuation or enlargement of hostilities by express declaration, i.e.,
even the constitutional authorization of emergency executive war power
of immediate self-defense terminates upon opportunity and failure of
Congress to sustain it by express declaration.
3. In the event that the Congress authorizes the initiation, con-
tinuation, or enlargement of military hostilities by express declara-
tion, the constitutional initiative of logistical, tactical, and strategic
decision in the conduct of those authorized hostilities belongs to the
executive.
4. A residual power of review and control is vested in the Con-
gress through its continuing authority over appropriations, levies upon
manpower, and its prerogative to modify or to repeal its declaration of
war.
III. THE NoN-DELEGABILITY OF THE CONGREssIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
The next level of question is to determine whether or not this
responsibility and power of Congress alone to declare war, it being
antecedent declaration of war by Congress, cf. 2 B. ScHrwARTz, A COMENTARY ON TH
CoNsTTruTIoN oe TmH UNITED STATES-PART I, THE Powmzs or GOVEMaNT 203-06
(1963), it may be more significant that even with all the distinguishing elements of the
case, four of nine Justices thought the decision to be incorrect and constitutionally
insupportable.
22 THm REcoRD oF Ammac DipLoMAcY 185 (R. Bartlett ed. 1954); Robertson,
South America and the Monroe Doctrine, 1824-28, 30 PoL. Sx. Q. 89-91 (1915).
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understood that in the absence of its exercise no executive authority in
the sustained extraterritorial engagement of military force has con-
stitutional foundation, is subject to delegation to some other office
or party. The question divides itself into two parts, the first being read-
ily answerable and the second being somewhat more doubtful: the first
being directed to alleged delegations by treaty, and the second being
directed to alleged prospective delegations by joint resolution.
In the current controversy, some support has been sought in the
fact of the Senate's earlier ratification of the Southeast Asia Treaty
combined with the constitutional provision that it is the President who
shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed, i.e., that he shall
act to fulfill that Treaty obligation. Not dissimilar reference was made
during the Korean War, conducted without declaration of war by
Congress, to the Uniting for Peace Resolution of the United Nations
which we were allegedly bound to support through executive action
alone.
Most discussions of this subject have countered these executive
claims simply by observing that the particular treaties cited in aid
of the President's actions are not self-executing of their obligations;
rather, they specifically do not purport prospectively to delegate the
power to declare war but merely establish an international obligation
that Congress will, when the circumstances contemplated by the treaty
actually arise, then act upon its authority to fulfill that obligation inso-
far as the use of military force may be involved. Thus, the Southeast
Asia Treaty provides that, in the event of armed attack on any member,
each signatory will "act to meet the common danger in accordance witk
its constitutional process."2 In short, the treaty commitment, rather
than empowering the President to undertake the use of military force,
sets an international contractual obligation-obliging Congress to make
the declaration of war if it intends to fulfill the treaty commitment. But
again, the cross-reference is back to the constitutional process that
Congress itself shall authorize the President to engage armed force
abroad before such use of force would become legitimate under our in-
ternal law as we have deemed fit to regulate it, even in the phraseology
of the treaty we have signed. It follows, therefore, that the unilateral
invocation of the particular treaty responsibility by the President can-
not stand as a substitute for a specific and requisite authorization by
Congress upon such occasions when our assistance pursuant to that
treaty may be sought.
But a conclusive answer on this score is not dependent upon the
23 Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, Feb. 4, 1959, art. IV, para. 1, [1955] 1
U.S.T. 81, T.I.A.S. No. 3170 (emphasis added).
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conservative parsing of particular treaty phrases, for it is clear in any
event that the war power cannot constitutionally be delegated by treaty
at all. Treaties become law when made under the authority of the
United States merely upon ratification by two-thirds of the Senate
alone. This alternative of lodging the war power in the combination of
the President and the Senate-rather than in the House and the Senate
as was finally done with the war power-was specifically considered
in the Philadelphia Convention and explicitly rejected.2 4 No case,
therefore, can be made that a treaty can grant to a third party, or
indeed grant to the President pursuant to that treaty, the authority to
engage in systematic military hostilities abroad as a claim of faithful
execution of the law of that treaty. No treaty, or anything else for that
matter, can serve as a declaration of war, thus satisfying that section
of the Constitution, unless shared in by the House of Representatives:
the constitutional draftsmen engaged in a deliberate, determined, and
successful effort to include that body, with its more popular representa-
tion, in the decision prerequisite to sustained armed hostilities.
If the treaty power does not permit Congress to delegate its war
powers to the President, what then of the propriety of other means, for
example, a joint resolution, whereby both Houses of Congress might at-
tempt prospectively to shift to the President the determination of the
use of war as an instrument of national policy? In favor of that read-
ing, one might review an enormous amount of material on the general
question of congressional delegation of legislative powers2 5 noting that
not since the 1930's has the executive exercise of authority following
even a loose prospective attempt at delegation been disfavored by the
Supreme Court on constitutional grounds;" that the Court has waxed
most eloquent in favor of congressionally-supported, quasi-legislative
presidential discretion in foreign affairs; 27 that decisions sustaining
prospective delegations with but the barest hint of standards can
24 See 1 REcoRDs, supra note 8, at 292, 300; 2 id. 318-19.
2 5
See, e.g., L. JAFFE & N. NATHaNSON, ADaISTRATIVE LAW 81-122 (1968). Pro-
fessor Davis, possibly the leading exponent of a liberal delegation view, disparages the
importance or sufficiency of legislatively-stipulated guidelines vis-a-vis the alleged greater
importance of adequate procedural safeguards, appropriate legislative supervision or
reexamination, and the accustomed scope of judicial review. 1 K. DAVIS, ADnm=sTRAT=vz
LAW TREATisE 99 (1958). As the Supreme Court has wholly failed to provide any judicial
review, as there are no procedural prerequisites to the executive rendering of his
authorization, and as the fait accompli of executive action appears to overwhelm the
capacity for legislative supervision or reexamination at the point in time when it is
most needed, however, all these alternative protections in respect to the delegation of
war declarations being conspicuously weak, perhaps the delegation doctrine ought to be
applied more restrictively in this area than in any other. See also Wright, Beyond Discre-
tionary Justice, 81 YALE L.J. 575, 582-87 (1972).
2 6 Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) ; Panama Refining
Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
27 See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
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readily be found;2 8 that at least the usual strong presumption of con-
stitutionality would apply were the executive to be challenged on the
validity of a clear and specific congressional statement of delegation;
and that even where a "preferred freedom" was involved the furthest
the Court has gone in recent decades has been to construe the scope
of delegation short of the executive presumption 9 In 1965, moreover,
but a single vote could be mustered from the Supreme Court that Con-
gress had too far abdicated its legislative responsibility in granting the
President and Secretary of State power to regulate passports under
a statute providing nothing more definite on its face than that it
should be done "under such rules as the President shall designate and
prescribe . . .. 30
In a characteristically literate and measured criticism of executive
action in Vietnam (which he concludes went beyond the authority dele-
gated by that portion of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution he considers),
Professor Bickel of the Yale Law School finds that the power to
delegate the war power to the President is granted to Congress, pro-
vided only (but importantly) that it not be "without standards [the
absence of which] short circuits the lines of responsibility that make
the political process meaningful.""1 I agree entirely with Professor
Bickel so far as he would go, to construe congressional attempts at dele-
gation on so momentous a subject most conservatively.
I am inclined to go considerably further, however, for it seems to
me clearly the case that the exclusive responsibility of Congress to re-
solve the necessity and appropriateness of war as an instrument of
national policy at any given time is uniquely not delegable at all. The
pursuit of national interest by sustained extraterritorial uses of direct
force was textually reserved to Congress alone after alternative formu-
lations were pressed on precisely the grounds that conventionally ration-
alize a limited power to delegate an interstitial lawmaking authority to
the executive, viz., superior expertise in the executive, the need for
2 8 E.g., Fahy v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947).
29 Kent v. Dules, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
30 Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1965) (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 211 (a) (1970))
(Black, J., dissenting) (The Court was divided 6-3 on the basic questions whether the
Secretary of State's refusal to validate passports for travel in Cuba was statutorily and
constitutionally permissible). See also Professor Rostow's very forceful discussion in Ros-
tow, Great Cases Make Bad Law: The War Powers Act, 50 TEXAs L. Rav. 833, 885-92
(1972).
31 Bickel, Congress, the President and the Power to Wage War, 48 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 131, 137 (1971). For similar views that the Tonkin Gulf Resolution lacked adequate
standards, see Velvel, The War in Viet Nam: Unconstitutional, Justiciable, and Juris-
dictionally Attackable, in 2 TH VIETNAa WAR AWD INTERNATioNAL LAW 680 (R. Falk
ed. 1969), and Wormuth, The Vietnam War: The President versus the Constitution, in
id. 780-90.
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flexibility in the face of rapidly changing circumstances, the cum-
bersomeness of parliamentary processes, and a residual power to check
the executive in the event of displeasure with the manner in which he
might make war. To the extent that such arguments were considered to
have merit, they were accommodated by other means among the sev-
eral war-related clauses. To the extent that they were not thus accom-
modated, the conclusion seems inescapable that they were rejected and
correspondingly, that no further latitude of executive control was to be
permitted than that already provided for.
To express the same matter less passionately, specific contingen-
cies which give sense and shape to the general doctrine permitting
limited delegations of legislative power in other areas of congressional
responsibility are already provided for in respect to war, so far as it
was felt safe to do so. Thus, it was contemplated and made possible
that peacetime armies might be raised under presidential discretion
though this might even increase the risk of war. Similarly, an interim
executive capacity to respond to outright emergencies, authorizing the
president to resist invasion or repel an attack when war might be
thrust upon the nation too quickly for Congress to convene to authorize
even such limited defensive measures, was provided. Additionally,
executive discretion to make command decisions of tactics and
strategy within the express war declaration by Congress was conceded.
Further, confidence was also reposed of necessity in the President in
recognizing that the congressional power would be exercised or not
substantially depending upon the information and advice the President
would provide in his emergency message of exigent circumstances ask-
ing for their decision to initiate hostilities, sustain present emergency
defensive war actions he had taken, enlarge upon them, or, by doing
nothing, require that our extraterritorial forces be immediately dis-
engaged and withdrawn. Finally, although there might have been much
to be said for a different view (so to make going to war especially grave
and therefore desirably difficult to accomplish), the Constitution does
not require that the declaration of war be an all or nothing response.
In the exercise of its responsibility, it is not essential that Congress
must declare a total war against one or more nations, contemplating
effective occupation of their territory and capitulation by their govern-
ments. Rather, the document contemplates congressional recourse to a
declaration of limited war with specifically designated objectives which
the President may then pursue through the use of armed force once
that specific declaration and circumscribed objective have been ar-
ticulated by Congress.
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For instance, by the Act of July 7, 1798, Congress authorized
President Adams to respond to French depredations on the seas in the
following very specific and limited war terms:
That the President of the United States shall be, and he
is hereby authorized to instruct the commanders of the public
armed vessels which are, or which shall be employed in the
service of the United States, to subdue, seize and take any
armed French vessel, which shall be found within the juris-
dictional limits of the United States, or elsewhere, on the
high seas .... .2
Without question, the President's execution of that antecedent authori-
zation of specific armed force would have been pursuant to a declara-
tion ("hereby authorized . . . to subdue, seize and take") of limited
war. Similarly, in passing on the question in a case raising the issue,
Mr. Justice Chase declared for the Supreme Court in 1800 that:
Congress is empowered to declare a general war, or Congress
may wage a limited war; limited in place, in objects, in time.33
A present and specific authorization of armed force against the terri-
tory or possessions of another country does not fail as a prerequisite
congressional declaration of war, of course, simply by the nature of the
objectives or extent of war that it may authorize.3
But precisely because of these various provisions and accommo-
dations, it is even more clearly the case that there is no standing room
left for a theory which would transfer to the executive the power to
authorize war on his own initiation. When all the accommodations to
shared authority otherwise provided by the several war-related clauses
are thus aggregated, it becomes quite evident that the determination
as to whether circumstances at any given time in fact make it necessary
and appropriate to engage in war, however limited in scope or objec-
tives, resides solely in Congress subject to no delegation whatever. In-
3 2 Act of July 9, 1798, ch. 68, §1, 1 Stat. 578.
3 3 Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 43 (1800).
3 4 Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 28 (1801) (Marshall, C.j.):
The whole powers of war being, by the constitution of the United States, vested
in congress, the acts of that body can alone be resorted to as our guides in this
inquiry. It is not denied, nor, in the course of the argument, has it been denied,
that congress may authorize general hostilities, in which case the general laws
of war apply to our situation; or partial hostilities, in which case the laws of
war, so far as they actually apply to our situation, must be noticed.
Even the very marginal use of force, in satisfaction of private grievances unredressed
by an offending sovereign against whom the government might not wish to commit a
public force as an act of war, was subjected to prerequisite and exclusive congressional
control in its sole authority to issue letters of marque and reprisal. The provision was
added in Convention on August 18, 1787, the day following the principal discussion of
the war power, Mr. Gerry remarking that such provision should be made as it was not
clear that letters of marque were subsumed in the power of war. 2 REcoRDs, supra note 8,
at 326.
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deed, were it the case that the Constitution contemplated a capacity
in Congress simply to stipulate conditions (however clearly stated)
upon whose happening as subsequently determined by the President
war would then be deemed to be declared, it would be a surpassingly
strange departure from the concerns that gave the clause its final form:
Mr. GERRY never expected to hear in a republic a motion
to empower the Executive alone to declare war.
Mr. MASON was against giving the power of war to the
Executive, because not safely to be trusted with it . . . .5
Again, this proposition also is not without its testing early in the
history of the Constitution. During the conflict with France, in 1798,
Hamilton prepared legislation which would have empowered "the
President 'at his discretion . . . to declare that a state of war exists
between the two countries if negotiations with France did not begin by
August 1 or, if they started, should they fail." President Adams wrote
to Harrison Gray Otis, Chairman of the House Committee on Defense
(through whom the bill was introduced) that Hamilton was crazy.
Adams and Pickering maintained that war did not exist between the
two countries, given the absence of a congressional declaration to that
effect.. 6
Against the background of this general discussion, it may now
be appropriate to offer a personal assessment of the war in Vietnam.
IV. AN APPLICATION TO VIETNAM
The interim emergency defense war power of the President, to
engage in acts of war without declaration of war by Congress, did not
endure beyond the moment that the attack upon American destroyers
had been repelled and an opportunity was provided for Congress to
deliberate. From that time forward, through the undoubted, massive,
and prolonged war in Vietnam, no authority existed for the President's
ever-widening uses of armed force in the absence of a declaration of
war by Congress.
Such a declaration, to have been sufficient, need not have been un-
qualified or in any specific form. It would, however, have to have been
approved by both Houses of Congress. Equally, it would also have to
have expressed a specific and unequivocal commitment by Congress,
clearly authorizing the President thereafter to employ armed force at
35 2 id. 318-19.
3 6 A. DE CoNDE, TH QuAsI-WAR: THE Poumcs AND DinomMcY oF THE UNDECLARED
WAR wirT FRANCE, 1797-1801, at 171 (1966).
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the level of engagement, in the area of engagement, and against such
parties involved in that engagement, as he did in fact pursue. The
necessity for this extent of antecedent congressional action, not subject
to correction or repair by anything that even Congress might do later
on as war was to develop, is built into the declaration of war clause it-
self: a pause must occur following the first use of war power even in
emergencies and prior to any further deterioration of relationships;
inertial movement down the slippery face of war is momentarily
arrested by the force of constitutional requirement and cannot be
resumed save on deliberate choice affirmatively asserted by joint decla-
ration of war by both Houses. For this reason, it is not possible to con-
jure up suitable later substitutes for any congressional action which
may have failed at the time as a requisite declaration of war. On the
other hand, assuming that an otherwise suitable declaration of war had
been made by Congress, it would of course have remained subject to
subsequent modification or repeal, just as the continuing capacity of the
executive would depend upon adequate congressional support in the
supply of money and manpower. In the event of an act of unqualified
repeal, the President would again lack authority save only to with-
draw all forces from the area of war at once.
Without conceding that any kind of declaration of war was re-
quired antecedent to its widening pursuit of war following the incident
of Tonkin Gulf, the executive has at different times claimed one or
more of three sets of congressional action for its presumption. Two of
these, consisting of two treaties and a variety of congressional bills of
conscription and appropriation, clearly do not meet the requisites of an
antecedent declaration of war. The reasons for their inadequacy should
now already be apparent, but I shall briefly outline them again. The
third, the Tonkin Gulf Resolution of August 10, 1964,87 may just
possibly have done so, however, notwithstanding the subsequent
protestations of a number of members of Congress who joined in the
vote to adopt that Resolution. In retrospect, promulgation of the Ton-
kin Gulf Resolution as a possible declaration of war may seem ironic.
Even so, the greater irony by far occurred six years, four months, and
two days later: on January 12, 1971, this arguably sufficient declara-
tion of war was repealed without qualification. 8
In repealing the Tonkin Gulf Resolution outright, rather than
amending it to preserve executive authority to persist in the use of
armed force at some level, for at least some purposes, for example, as
87H.Rj. Res. 1145, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 78 Stat. 384 (1964), reproduced at text
accompanying notes 42, 44 infra.
88Act of Jan. 12, 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-672, § 12, 84 Stat. 2053.
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might be thought essential to negotiate the return of prisoners, Congress
wholly removed the only authority which sustained the executive use
of armed force in Vietnam. It matters not at all that the President
(a different President, of course) may by then have disclaimed reliance
upon the Tonkin Gulf Resolution or, indeed, that members of Congress
may not themselves have intended the consequence of their affirmative
vote for outright repeal, any more than careless misapprehension of
the significance of one's vote can alter the consequence of other acts of
Congress. The repeal being complete when signed by the President him-
self on January 12, 1971, the executive use of armed force in Vietnam
since that date has been without constitutional authority.
Executive claims in respect to congressional authorization for the
sustained use of armed force in Vietnam, as previously stated, rested
partly upon two treaties, the Southeast Asia Treaty and, indirectly,
the Charter of the United Nations, both of which the Senate had pre-
viously ratified. In answer to the objection that the ratification of these
treaties can in no manner be construed as declarations of war, the
claim may be offered that ratification can be understood either as the
delegation of authority to the President so to declare war when in his
judgment conditions triggering our treaty obligations arise and we are
called upon to fulfill them, or if that view is inadmissible, that ratifica-
tion of the treaty was itself an inchoate declaration of war subsequently
effective upon determination of the President under circumstances
that he would assess in accordance with the terms of the treaties. For
each of three reasons, however, the claim utterly fails.
First, neither treaty provides any basis in fact for the claim that
is made. To the contrary, each provides that commitment to the use of
force must be made only "in accordance with [our] constitutional
process."3 9 Assuming that one such obligation may involve the actual
engagement of armed force, fulfillment of a treaty obligation is thus
to furnish an occasion for Congress to act under the declaration of war
clause, without, however, dispensing with the constitutional necessity
of that action as an essential predicate to the executive use of military
force. Insofar as the President may have been placed under an inde-
pendent duty of his own in this respect, i.e., faithfully to execute the
obligation of the treaty consistent with our constitutional processes, it
was only to take account of subsequent conditions which in his judg-
ment called up our obligation to engage in war and thereupon urgently
to convene and to address Congress that Congress should act upon its
3 9 U.N. CHARTER, art. 43, para. 3 (concerned with ratification of agreements). The
comparable language from the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (concerned with
action to meet a threat) is quoted at text accompanying note 23 supra.
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own obligation. Under no view, however, is it maintainable that either
treaty attempted to dispense with the constitutional requisite of subse-
quent congressional declaration prior to the actual commitment of
armed force.
Second, even assuming a limited power in Congress to shift the
determination to embark upon war to the President, under specified
conditions expressed in clear and definite guidelines, the transfer of
such authority cannot be accomplished by treaty. The House of Repre-
sentatives' prerequisite consent to this nation's involvement in war
was most deliberately required by the declaration of war clause after
consideration of several alternatives, including the specific proposed
alternative of vesting the power jointly in the Senate and President
alone which was itself rejected.40 As the House does not consent to
treaties, manifestly a treaty cannot be among the possible means of
delegating its authority. To imply that the constitutional draftsmen
could possibly have formulated a document so specific in its precau-
tions against involvements of war while simultaneously creating an
enormous loophole of exclusive Senate power to give it away by simple
treaty ratification is wholly without logic or evidence.
Third, and more briefly still, for reasons offered earlier I believe
that the declaration of war clause disallows any delegation at all, i.e.,
that Congress not only lacks power to relieve itself of that responsi-
bility by shifting it generally to the President, but that it may not do so
even fortified with the strictest and most unequivocal guidelines
"merely" enabling the President to direct the sustained use of armed
force when, in his judgment, specific conditions have arisen to trigger
a prior authorization by Congress. Consider it as one will, the require-
ment that Congress shall declare war if and when war is to be declared
at all leaves no room for contingent declarations where the determina-
tion of the contingency is sought to be dislocated from Congress subject
only to a power to reclaim it too late to serve the function of the clause.
The congressional responsibility may not be thus diluted, no matter
how eagerly Congress itself might wish to be quit of it, nor will it do
at all to argue that Congress might always reclaim its authority and
thereupon vote against the pursuit of war if in disagreement with the
President's assessment that led him to trigger the use of armed force
pursuant to the congressional delegation. For again, the function of
the clause was to force a momentary pause upon Congress even on the
brink of hostilities, that there could be no slipping into war where the
slippage itself might well transfigure what would otherwise have been
a congressional decision not to become engaged.
40 See 2 RECORDs, supra note 8, at 318-19.
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Especially for this reason, as well as for the reason that none of the
subsequent "supportive" bills of appropriation or manpower even pur-
port to direct the specific use of armed force (though many were
doubtless passed with complicit understanding of how the President
proposed to use the additional monies and manpower thus made avail-
able), neither can these later and related pieces of legislation repair the
omission of a declaration of war required before hostilities had been
allowed to proceed in a manner making it impossible to say how far
they had trammeled the congressional choice. In short, the declaration
of war clause provides no means by which Congress can reduce its re-
sponsibility to a different task than that assigned to it, i.e., the qualita-
tively different task, rejected as an inadequate constitutional safeguard,
to check the dog of war after it had already been released by executive
action.4
There remains only the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. Part of it, the
following part in section 2, seems not at all sufficient as a declaration of
war:
The United States regards as vital to its national interest
and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and
security in Southeast Asia. Consonant with the Constitution of
the United States and the Charter of the United Nations and
in accordance with its treaty obligations under the Southeast
Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, there-
fore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all neces-
sary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any
member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective
Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its free-
dom 2
There is altogether lacking here a present declaration of war. On its
face, the section does no more than to serve notice that the country is
prepared to go to war in the event of that necessity as a means of
fulfilling its treaty obligation. The Congress states, moreover, that it
has full confidence in the President and will be guided in its actions
by what the President recommends. A resolution sharply pointing up
4 1 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, Sept. 6, 1789, in C. WARwr,
THE MAKING oF TH CONSTITUTION 481 n.1 (1928):
We have already given, in example, one effectual check to the dog of war, by
transferring the power of letting him loose from the Executive to the Legislative
body, from those who are to spend to those who are to pay.
Consider also Mr. Justice Brandeis' observation (dissenting in Myers v. United States,
272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926)):
The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of
1787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power.
The purpose was, not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction
incident to the distribution of the governmental powers among three depart-
ments, to save the people from autocracy.
4 2 H.RJ. Res. 1145, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., § 2, 78 Stat. 384 (1964).
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what Congress is "prepared" to do is doubtless within the power of
Congress publicly to resolve and may indeed be extremely useful. That
it constitutes a present declaration of even limited hostilities is mani-
festly unreasonable for anyone to infer. That it is an oblique and dis-
ingenuous present authorization to the President, that he is thereafter
to utilize armed force as he deems necessary to vindicate the readiness
of the country to assist any member of SEATO upon their request,
surely twists the words ("[T]he United States is ... prepared ... to
take all necessary steps") and cannot be preferred on a matter of such
gravity.
48
The fact that section 2 seems so clearly a notice of warning, rather
than a declaration of war, doubtless lends support to an argument favor-
ing a similar and co-ordinated construction for the balance of the whole
Resolution. Yet, a contrary possibility cannot be dismissed on that
basis alone, and the very different wording of the balance of the Resolu-
tion must be seen in its entirety: 44
Whereas naval units of the Communist regime in
Vietnam, in violation of the principles of the Charter of the
United Nations and of international law, have deliberately
and repeatedly attacked United States naval vessels lawfully
present in international waters, and have thereby created a
serious threat to international peace; and
Whereas these attacks are part of a deliberate and sys-
tematic campaign of aggression that the Communist regime
in North Vietnam has been waging against its neighbors and
the nations joined with them in the collective defense of their
freedom; and
Whereas the United States is assisting the peoples of
Southeast Asia to protect their freedom and has no territorial,
military or political ambitions in that area, but desires only
that these peoples should be left in peace to work out their
own destinies in their own way: Now therefore, be it
4 3 But see, for the view that § 2 is a present authorization of force, Note, Congress,
the President, and the Power to Commit Forces to Combat, 81 HIAv. L. Rev. 1771, 1804
(1968): "This rather comprehensive language certainly supports the interpretation given
it by the administration: that it is a functional equivalent of a declaration of war."
Moreover, certain portions of the Senate debate favor that impression, e.g., 110 CoNG.
Rec. 18,410 (1964):
Mr. COOPER.... But the power provided the President in section 2 is great.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. This provision is intended to give clearance to the President
to use his discretion....
Mr. COOPER. I understand, and believe that the President will use this vast
power with judgment.
For the view that so interpreted, however, § 2 then fails as too broad a carte blanche
delegation of the war power, see note 25 supra. Consider also the views of Senator Morse,
one of but two Senators voting against the Resolution:
I shall not support any substitute which takes the form of a predated declara-
tion of war. In my judgment, that is what the pending joint resolution is.
110 CONG. REc. 18,139 (1964).
44 H.R.J. Res. 1145, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 78 Stat. 384 (1964).
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Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the
Congress approves and supports the determination of the
President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary mea-
sures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the
United States and to prevent further aggression.
Section 3. This resolution shall expire when the President
shall determine that the peace and security of the area is rea-
* sonably assured by international conditions created by action
of the United Nations or otherwise, except that it may be ter-
minated earlier by concurrent resolution of the Congress.
In spite of certain language which still looks in the same mood as
the "notice and warning" style of section 2, there is much here of a
different tone. In section 1 of the Resolution itself, Congress formally
resolves a joint and solemn approval and support for the President, as
Commander in Chief, not only to take all necessary measures to repel
any armed attack against the forces of the United States (which might
merely evidence positive support of the executive's interim emergency
power which he would possess in the absence of congressional restric-
tion and without declaration of war, but which might be believed useful
to relieve the executive of any margin of doubt or anxiety of subsequent
congressional criticism in the event of its exercise); it appears also to
authorize the President "to take all necessary measures . . . to pre-
vent further aggression" which section 2 of the preamble identifies as
"aggression that the Communist regime in North Vietnam has been
waging against its neighbors," presumably South Vietnam, Laos, and
Cambodia 5 Moreover, section 3, stipulating conditions under which
the Resolution will expire, would appear to be of no purpose if the en-
tire Resolution is to be taken merely as a solemn declaration of notice
and warning. Rather, what is it that may subsequently be termi-
nated by a later concurrent resolution of the Congress unless, indeed, it
is a present declaration of war authorizing the President to use armed
force as he finds necessary to thwart "further aggression" of the kind
which Congress declares North Vietnam has already undertaken
against its neighbors as well as "repeatedly" against our naval vessels
as "part of a deliberate and systematic campaign of aggression?"
The following exchange in the Senate, between Senator Fulbright,
45That the phrase extended at least to South Vietnam, and not merely to protec-
tion of other American ships from sudden attack, was explicitly acknowledged:
Mr. MILLER. It is left open. It does not say aggression against whom. It is
broad enough so that it could mean aggression against the United States, or
aggression against the South Vietnamese Government ....
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I believe that both are included in that phrase.
110 CoNG. Rm 18,405 (1964) (emphasis added).
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Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and floor manager for
the Resolution, and Senator Brewster is extremely telling:
Mr. BREWSTER. [M]y question is whether there is any-
thing in the resolution which would authorize or recommend
or approve the landing of large American armies in Vietnam
or in China.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. There is nothing in the resolution, as I
read it, that contemplates it. I agree with the Senator that
that is the last thing we would want to do. However, the lan-
guage of the resolution would not prevent it. It would autho-
rize whatever the Commander in Chief feels is necessary.48
And, again, in response to a question from Senator Cooper:
Mr. COOPER. Then, looking ahead, if the President decided
that it was necessary to use such force as could lead into war,
we will give that authority by this resolution?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is the way I would interpret it. If a
situation later developed in which we thought the approval
should be withdrawn, it could be withdrawn by concurrent
resolution.
47
One may faithfully attend other views of the matter, of course: that
the standards delimiting the executive use of force are too indefinite
thus to delegate the power to declare war; but is not section 1 rather
a present declaration and current authorization of executive power
sufficient for its purpose, and not a delegation at all? Again, the
Resolution "was passed with great speed and in the heat of emotion,"
at a time when "there were few American troops in Vietnam;"'I but
have not declarations of war most commonly been issued exactly under
such circumstances, and are they less adequate on that account even
assuming that explicit provision for the declaration of war clause may
not itself adequately have reckoned with this difficulty? Additionally,
it has been correctly noted that the next President foreswore any reli-
ance on the Resolution, and that even President Johnson never relied
exclusively upon it for his claim of authority;4  but what use or inter-
461d. 18,403 (emphasis added).
4 7
1d. 18,409 (emphasis added).
48 116 CONG. REc. S7119 (daily ed. May 13, 1970), reproducing a memorandum
signed by a number of legal luminaries.
49 117 CONG. RaE. H4342 (daily ed. May 25, 1971):
President Johnson said in a news conference: "We did not think the resolution
was necessary to do what we did and what we are doing." Hearings on S. Res.
151 before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 126
(1967). Nor does the current administration of President Nixon rely for au-
thority upon the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. On March 12, 1970, in response to
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pretation can safely be made of such subsequent politics? Finally, it is
true as well that not all who spoke at the time necessarily intended this
consequence of their vote, a telling example being the somewhat equiv-
ocal statement by Congressman Morgan, Chairman of the House
Foreign Affairs Committee that "this Resolution is definitely not an
advance declaration of war."50 Still, in all, it is exceedingly difficult
to disagree with Senator Eagleton's own reluctant conclusion that:
Faulty vision and political pressures cannot be permitted
to minimize the legal significance of the Tonkin Gulf Resolu-
tion .... Although the existence of the Tonkin Gulf Reso-
lution did not make the war we have waged in South Vietnam
any wiser or any more explicable, it did make it a legitimate
war authorized by the Congress.51
Were the question a different one, for instance one involving con-
scientious judicial determination of whether executive action ordering
troops or planes into China would exceed the bounds of the Tonkin
Gulf Resolution, then I should think it might quite sensibly be argued
that so great a quantum leap in the executive escalation of the Vietnam
War would have required that the President return to Congress, before
taking that leap, so as to secure a modified and expanded declaration of
the limited war previously declared.5" Given the Resolution as it was
framed, however (and the unabating manpower and financial support
Congress subsequently provided in the prosecution of the war), we
would succumb to the temptation of current remorse and an over-
wrought desire to find additional argument to force total disengagement
to insist that Congress never really declared the war at all.
Yet, ironies are heaped up on both sides, and resort to argument
torturing the original adequacy or scope of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution
is surprisingly beside the point so far as the constitutional imperative
of total disengagement is now concerned. As the President would have
had to return to Congress to secure constitutional authority for any
enlargement of the war that was declared and authorized by the Tonkin
Gulf Resolution, so too, at all times Congress retained the power to
amend the Resolution to reduce the scale of war or, indeed, to end it.
Rather than scaling down the war by any mere amendment, however,
a letter from Senator Fulbright, H. G. Torbert, Jr. stated on behalf of the
Department of State:
"[Tihis administration has not relied on or referred to the Tonkln Gulf
resolution of August 10, 1964, as support for its Vietnam policy. 21
50 110 CONG. REc. 18,539 (1964) (emphasis added).
51 Eagleton, Congress and the War Powers, 37 Mo. L. REv. 1, 14-15 (1970). In full
accord is Rostow, Great Cases Make Bad Law: The War Powers Act, 50 TExAs L. Rav.
833, 874-75 (1972).
52 See, e.g., Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 169 (1804).
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the unalterable fact of the matter is that Congress wholly repealed the
Tonkin Gulf Resolution. 3 Nothing having been left of it, and no sub-
sequent declaration of even limited war having been substituted, the
President now conducts hostilities in Vietnam utterly without consti-
tutional authority. It is simply true that the uses of American armed
force in Vietnam since January 12, 1971, defy the Constitution of the
United States.
53 Act of Jan. 12, 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-672, § 12, 84 Stat. 2053.
